

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.202
28 July 1964
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
	Mr. M. TELLO
	Mr. J. MERCADO
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. H. SOKALSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU
	Mr. P. MATEESCU
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
	Mr. B. VEGESACK
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
	Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH
	Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV
	Mr. I.M. PALENYKH
<u>United Arab Republic:</u>	Mr. A.F. HASSAN
	Mr. A. OSMAN
	Mr. M. KASSEM
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Sir Paul MASON
	Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
	Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Mr. S. de PALMA

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the two hundred and second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Allow me first to express my deep appreciation for the kind words of welcome which so many of my colleagues have addressed to me on my return here.

Personally, at this new encounter with the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I have been struck by a remarkable change. It is not merely a question of the atmosphere, which we know may fluctuate, like all climatic conditions; a more permanent gain has undoubtedly been achieved during the past six months in the degree of matter-of-factness in the proceedings. When the fireworks of polemics peter out, the real structure of any issue before us becomes revealed very much more clearly. Positions on the issues may well differ, but the discussion has become more detailed, more technical -- in one word, more constructive --; and I congratulate our Committee on that. I wonder whether the outside world realizes how much progress this means in the work for disarmament -- that is, progress within this Conference. The ground is now considerably better prepared for agreements, awaiting the day when the political authorities become ready to give the "go ahead" signal.

Returning to our Committee at this precise juncture in its deliberations on general and complete disarmament, I am particularly impressed by the progress which has been made towards a considerable area of agreement in regard to nuclear delivery vehicles. I might even say that sometimes, when I hear representatives lament the lack of agreement, I cannot help being reminded of Andersen's tale about the invisibility of the Emperor's garb; for I simply fail to detect any basic divergence of views. On the contrary, the remarkable feature is that such a definite drawing together of positions has been established and such an important compromise reached by the two main negotiating parties: that certain nuclear weapons and their means of delivery should be retained all through the disarmament process so as to provide a "nuclear shield". I am deliberately choosing that term instead of some others hitherto used which seem to have become tainted with a partisan colouring.

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This idea that the super-Powers should not shed all their nuclear armaments until the final stage of disarmament, when a new world security should have been created, was presented to us from the beginning as a Western one in the United States draft treaty (ENDC/30). The Soviet plan (ENDC/2), on the other hand, called for the total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles already in stage I, which would mean that it would be physically impossible from then on to wage nuclear war. The Swedish delegation did not pronounce itself on either of those proposals. However, when Mr. Gromyko, first in 1962 and then in 1963, announced that the Soviet Union too was willing to extend the right of retaining some nuclear capability through the whole duration of the disarmament process, Sweden was among the countries that welcomed this, precisely because it was a move which brought the positions of the two sides together. We acclaimed it as providing an assurance that disarmament could henceforth be discussed in more realistic terms than the "either/or" position of yore had promised (A/C.1/PV.1321, pp.56 et seq.). I am referring to a rather comprehensive statement by the Swedish delegation in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 30 October 1963.

The overriding phenomenon, of which we must never lose sight, is that a compromise has been achieved and that there is agreement in principle that a certain nuclear striking force may be retained by each of the two nuclear super-Powers to the end of the disarmament process. All other issues -- such as those of the size, character, composition and deployment of those forces, as well as the timing of the reductions needed to reach the agreed level, amounting to an elimination of all other means of nuclear delivery -- must be considered in the second place, as "modalities", appropriate for settlement after technical scrutiny in a working group. In support of this summing-up, I might have quoted a number of statements made around our conference table; but at this stage in our work it would have seemed redundant, as all delegations are so thoroughly aware of the arguments.

When I stress that agreement on fundamentals can now be taken for granted, I admit that I am disregarding other statements from both sides which introduce specifications -- or assume specifications -- on which, according to our view, it would seem premature to expect unanimity before a detailed study is made. Let me add here that the Swedish delegation hails as an important sign of progress, full of promise for our future work, the very planning of a working group. We have always held that only with much more profound technical preparations can our labour become truly effective.

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On the basis of such a propitious identity of views, it should not be too difficult to draft the terms of reference of the working group. Several non-aligned countries have also offered suggestions in order to assist our two co-Chairmen in their task. The co-Chairmen themselves must of course in this exercise of seeking formulations find it more difficult to take initiatives, as these might be interpreted as affecting the negotiating positions of the nuclear Powers so highly concerned in regard to substance. It is admittedly easier for us to offer suggestions which are understood to be only tentative and thus easily amended or even discarded without jeopardizing anybody's position or prestige.

The main quandary now seems to be the one referred to by, among others, Mr. Thomas at our meeting of 30 June, when he said:

"Therefore it seems important to me that, in considering the basis on which the working group should be set up, we should try to steer a steady course between two extremes ... On the one hand, the working group should not be on such a narrow basis that its detailed technical analysis fails to produce helpful results. On the other hand, the working group should not be on such a wide basis that its discussions become so diffuse as to be meaningless." (ENDC/PV.194, p.22)

That dilemma between terms of reference that are too wide or terms of reference that are too narrow ought to resolve itself if we bear in mind the possibility of indicating quite a wide frame within which the deliberations in the working group should be contained, but at the same time of prescribing in quite narrow terms the specific assignment with which the working group is more immediately charged. In other words, its members should be free within the frame to consider the whole problem of eliminating all means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- that is, item 5(b) of the agenda agreed on earlier (ENDC/52). But they should not be expected to work directly and immediately on that whole problem, solving it for us for all stages and for all States.

Such solutions are highly dependent on solutions in other sectors of the disarmament process and therefore must be given only some provisional treatment. Rather what we should expect from them in the immediate phase of their work is a close technical study of what the retention of some of these nuclear delivery vehicles by the two nuclear super-Powers to the end of stage III should amount to.

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That is to say, the working group ought to begin by concentrating on the "shield" more specifically in stage III, while necessarily, from that centre of attention, gradually including in their considerations the effects of their suggested solution on all means of delivery not included in the "shield", and particularly on the increased possibility of an early elimination of them which would result from the retention of the "shield".

Following the opposite course -- that is, starting from the outset with negotiations in the whole field of nuclear delivery vehicles -- would seem to make the terms of reference too wide and the work plan too loose. The basic agreement which already exists on the principle of retaining a "shield" calls for a concentrated effort to circumscribe this concept more precisely, thus obtaining a fixed parameter which would make the wider equation so much easier to deal with. It goes without saying that the whole operation should be hypothetical, open to adjustment so that it may fit in with subsequent agreements on other parts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I have purposely refrained from using the words "nuclear umbrella" to denote the problem on which attention should be primarily focussed, lest such a terminology might lend itself to being interpreted to mean that the group should study only the so-called Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), with its specifications for the nuclear striking power to be retained. As the United States plan for a disarmament treaty (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3) also contains as a constitutive element the idea that a certain nuclear force should be retained until the end of the disarmament process, we must exploit the fortunate circumstance of having one specific problem to submit to the close technical scrutiny of experts, while, as I have said, also expecting from them guidance on how to deal with features which lie within the wider circle of disarmament measures.

With that purpose in mind -- to provide in the terms of reference a fairly wide frame for the deliberations and a very specific mandate for the work -- our two co-Chairmen, it seems to us, might be able to put to good use the suggestions already made for the formulation of the terms of reference by some of our colleagues from non-aligned countries. I refer particularly to the terms indicated by India (ENDC/PV.194, p.12), the work plan suggested by the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.198, pp.16,17) and the working document submitted by Nigeria (ENDC/136). Additional suggestions might be made informally.

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In attempting to make the distinction between a wider frame for the deliberations of the working group and a more specific assignment for its work, the Swedish delegation has had very much in mind the practical aspect of how the group could proceed most effectively. Using such an approach, not based on a priori reasoning, it further seems to us that the whole task would be much more manageable if the work plan were turned upside down, so to speak. Instead of starting with what should happen in stage I, when the problems connected with the method of reduction -- whether massive or by percentages -- of the existing means of delivery are immediately encountered, the working group would do much better to focus first on what kind of nuclear shield should exist at the end of the disarmament process -- that is, in stage III --, leaving to a second round the questions of the methods and the pace by which that level is to be reached. Such a procedure would have advantages both from the technical and from the political angle.

Politically speaking, such a procedure not only would avoid having to deal with the questions of balance in the period nearest to the actual existing situation, but would also make unnecessary any immediate divulgence of present strength by the two sides. These would, on the other hand, be two of the most pressing concerns if the starting-point were the existing level and the first task were to decide what nuclear delivery vehicles should be allowed to remain at the end of stage I, or what reduction should take place in stage I, which is the same thing.

From the technical point of view the advantage is no less important, since, without the issue having been prejudged, the working group can attempt to estimate directly what would constitute a suitable "mix" for each side in order to secure the desirable nuclear protection. That would free the Committee from pronouncing itself in advance on the question of whether the shield should be made up exclusively of missiles, and of only certain kinds of missiles.

Allowing the group to study as objectively as possible the appropriate "mix" in the last phase of disarmament would also free this Committee from the burden of having to define in advance by what method balance should be achieved. That a balance should obtain, that an equitable protection should be offered to both sides, must of course be an underlying premise for the work; otherwise there would be no prospect

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of agreement. The kind of balance that at present seems to prevail is, as has been repeatedly stated by the United States delegation, only a "rough balance". That balance cannot be expressed as any exact numerical relationship between various weapons or their means of delivery, but is more a kind of mutual knowledge of an approximate "stability". Obviously the working group should try to find a similar kind of balance which would be satisfactory to both sides, although at a considerably lower level. In order to be able to strike that balance, I believe, we must leave the working group free to discuss relative quantities in terms of any conceivable "mix". It might even use some modern technical devices for trying to determine an appropriate composition for the shield. That could become the first real international exercise in strategic programming. In this operation several hypothetical "mixes" must be tried out. I believe the working group should also be afforded the possibility of presenting not only one but several alternative constructions in its report to us.

Consequently our suggestion is that the working group -- focussing first on stage III -- should be given the specific assignment of elaborating a formula for such a "mix" of types and quantities of nuclear delivery vehicles as would be suitable for an agreement on a nuclear shield of low capacity sufficient to act as a safety reserve. In this context we should remind ourselves that one reason for keeping the retained nuclear vehicles at a low level is to reduce the risk of unleashing a war through technical accident.

The second task would be to study how to reach that new "mix" at the low level -- that is, taking up the questions of timing, phasing and methods of eliminating the residual means of delivery. That is a much wider problem and therefore must cede precedence to the one just outlined as being the more specific and therefore primary one. I need only remind the Committee again that the elimination problem concerns all means of delivery and all States, whereas the retention problem directly concerns only two States. It should also be foreseen that the working group may be able only to give specific recommendations for reducing those types of vehicles which are to be retained in the "mix" of each party's nuclear shield. In that exercise the formula of reduction by agreed percentages might be applicable in a new way -- that is, a percentage-wise scrapping, during a shorter or longer period, of the capability which lies above the agreed level for the shield, in regard to each type of vehicle included in the "mix".

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While dealing with the technical character of the mandate to the working group I also wish to support suggestions made by some delegations, notably the Romanian delegation (ENDC/PV.196, p.10), that the group might submit not only a final report but also some interim reports. Whether they should be at regular periods or on an ad hoc basis is difficult to judge. But on one score I am more certain. If the work procedure which I have suggested is accepted -- that is, for the working group to start with some very specific questions regarding the retention of some nuclear delivery vehicles -- the group should be expected to refer to the Committee whenever it comes up against issues which, while of relevance to the deliberations within the group, have wider ramifications -- this in order that the terms of reference of the working group might be appropriately amended or that deliberations on such issues might be pursued within this Committee.

In the view of the Swedish delegation, some of these wider questions must be taken up with some urgency. If I briefly mention them here, I hope it might also serve to counteract any impression that our suggestions for the terms of reference and working procedure in relation to the working group are simplifications to the point of naïveté. We are deeply aware that some very complicated issues are involved.

One of them has been emphasized in the work plan presented by the delegation of the United Arab Republic, which suggested that the first of the issues to be defined by the working group should be "the precise purpose and aim of the retained means of delivery." (ENDC/PV.198, p.17). I fully agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, that this question stands in need of clarification; but I wonder whether it would be right to consign such a matter of principle to the working group. Of course, if the stress is to be laid on the adjective "precise", I agree. However, would it not be preferable to have a clearer understanding in this Committee of the very purpose of the nuclear shield? Or has a common understanding on this point already been achieved? Let me try an interpretation by exegesis of what has been said by the representatives of the nuclear Powers. If I am not contradicted, we might consider the matter settled. Otherwise, I am afraid, the Committee will have to have further discussion for the sake of clarification.

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The purpose of the retention of a nuclear shield by the United States and the Soviet Union during the disarmament process would be assumed to be to provide security for them against aggression. Words similar to those used by Mr. Tsarapkin on 14 July often recur:

"... sufficient for dealing an overwhelming, devastating blow at any aggressor ..." (*ibid.*, p.29).

They contain, it seems to me, an implicit assumption that the two super-Powers must preserve sufficient strength not only to countervail what is usually referred to as "the other side" but also to be capable of deterring attack by any other Power during the different phases of the disarmament process. However, it would also follow that the purpose of the deterrent should not be to deal with conflicts between what might be called third parties.

Of course, after disarmament we expect to live in a world where no armed conflicts should occur; but until the end of the disarmament process, as well as for erratic occurrences thereafter, recourse must be had to other means of security. The planning of the peace-keeping machinery must proceed, and the shape of the international security forces must be outlined. They must be so effectively organized that there should be no temptation to call for the use of the nuclear deterrent for any purpose other than the very specific exigencies envisaged for it.

It is only natural that this problem should be of particular interest to the non-aligned and non-nuclear States. If, for the sake of making a realistic start with the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, we are ready to accept the feature of a nuclear shield for the super-Powers, we cannot deny that this means an incomparably greater strength for them in relation to all the other States. Thus it becomes legitimate to stress the necessity to build up the international security forces during the disarmament process.

The purpose of these last comments of mine is to suggest that, simultaneously with the study on the nuclear shield and the elimination of other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, which we hope will soon start within the working group, we in this Committee should urgently proceed to a consideration of the establishment of

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these international peace-keeping forces. In order that we shall be able to judge the merits of the recommendations made to us by the working group for a decrease in national security forces, we must have a clearer view of the compensating increase in international security arrangements. Of course, there could be no intention to build up these new forces measure for measure as the old ones are retrenched; the new security must ultimately rely on a more solid foundation of confidence, to be engendered pari passu with the disarmament process.

During earlier meetings several speakers have stressed that the setting up of the working party should not bring to a halt the deliberations on general and complete disarmament within the Committee itself. The Swedish delegation wishes to suggest that the Committee should place on its agenda, as a "natural second", the question of the establishment of the international peace-keeping force. Such a review would correspond with our present intentions to let the working group cover problems concerning nuclear vehicles through all three stages. Let me say within parentheses that in so doing we are actually going beyond the agenda established two years ago for dealing with stage I -- an agenda which could now stand some amendment.

We might do well to treat the problem of the international peace-keeping force in the same way -- that is, to deal comprehensively with the proposals contained in the two draft treaties for all three stages of disarmament together with other proposals made or to be made in this Committee. I might even suggest that also on that item we start from the far end -- from how we want that force to be shaped when it assumes the ultimate responsibility for world peace -- and thereafter outline the course we should have to take in order to reach that goal from where we now stand.

I might make the parallel still more complete. This Committee also discusses collateral measures aimed at altering the present situation in the direction of our goal of disarmament, on the assumption that such measures will one day be fitted into a scheme for general and complete disarmament. Similarly, the United Nations has felt the need for establishing some ad hoc emergency forces; and more universal interest has recently been manifested in the initiatives taken by some States,

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including my own, to set up stand-by contingents for service with the United Nations. But any arrangements of today -- or, let us say, of tomorrow -- with regard to United Nations forces, organized ad hoc to be operative for defence, must sooner or later be linked up with the plans for such forces within the scheme of general and complete disarmament. It is the task of our Committee to prepare such plans.

So let us begin. Let us stake enough courage and confidence in our own work. If this autumn we could report to the United Nations General Assembly that we have (1) set up a technical working group to deal with the problems of the nuclear shield and the concomitant elimination of all other means of nuclear weapon delivery and (2) started to tackle the problem of peace-keeping forces needed during and after disarmament, then I believe we should have a sufficiently proud record to show in the field of general and complete disarmament. I also believe that the world at large might start to take some solace from the work of our Conference. In order really to believe in disarmament one needs some image of what the world would be like at the other end of the process, which it is our duty to blue-print.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Once again we are spending a Tuesday morning discussing the question of setting up a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles.

We have just listened to a typically practical and forthright contribution from our Swedish colleague. We shall, of course, study very carefully Mrs. Myrdal's statement today. I can say at this moment that we agree with a great deal of what she has submitted. I am thinking particularly at this moment of her observations on the importance of getting started with the establishment of the working group. If I understood her correctly, Mrs. Myrdal expressed what was a perhaps natural impatience at the fact that we had taken so long already in reaching agreement upon the terms on which this working group might be set up. I fully share that sense of impatience.

Indeed, at our meeting last Tuesday, I had to express, with regret, some fear that our Soviet colleague might have taken a step backwards on the question of setting up this working group (ENDC/PV.200, pp.7,9). I did so because at previous meetings Mr. Tsarapkin had seemed to be insisting that as a precondition for a

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working group we should accept in principle the Soviet version of the "nuclear umbrella" concept — a concept which he appears to equate with Mr. Gromyko's proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). I expressed the hope that I had misinterpreted Mr. Tsarapkin; but, after careful study of his remarks last Tuesday, I can only conclude, again with regret, that my interpretation had not been so very wide of the mark. I need not quote at any length from our Soviet colleague's statement on that occasion to show that, in his view, the "nuclear umbrella" concept and Mr. Gromyko's proposal are, in effect, one and the same thing. But, if any proof is required, I think it is to be found on page 23 of document ENDC/PV.200, where our Soviet colleague specifically referred to the "nuclear umbrella" in precisely the same terms as he has so often used in outlining Mr. Gromyko's proposal. He said that his Government had proposed that —

"... the Soviet Union and the United States should retain right up to the end of the disarmament process a 'nuclear umbrella' — that is, a strictly limited and agreed quantity of intercontinental, anti-missile and ground-to-air missiles."

Western delegations at the Conference have often explained in the past why we doubt whether Mr. Gromyko's proposal — in so far as we understand it — would in fact provide the kind of reliable "nuclear umbrella" we shall require during the disarmament process. I do not propose this morning to recapitulate all the cogent reasons for our doubts; they are well known to the Committee. Nevertheless, I repeat, Western delegations are fully ready, despite these doubts, to examine Mr. Gromyko's proposal in a working group as a matter of priority, in the hope that we shall be told more about it and that we shall therefore be in a position to make a final assessment of its feasibility or otherwise.

What we cannot accept is the restriction of the terms of reference of a working group to such an extent that discussion of other proposals, from whatever quarter they may be advanced, is precluded. I submit, as I have submitted before, that ours is a reasonable position. I feel sure that the Committee will agree that delegations should be entirely free to put forward proposals, some of which may provide us with a better method than that apparently suggested by Mr. Gromyko for reaching our agreed objective.

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Mr. Tsarapkin did, certainly, tell us that his delegation ---

"... do not at all demand that the Western Powers should accept any concrete plan of ours for the creation of a 'nuclear umbrella'."

(ENDC/PV.200, p.27).

That was a remark that I was glad to note. It would now be difficult for our Soviet colleagues to make such a demand, because they themselves recently admitted that, as we also have pointed out (ENDC/PV.198, p.19), Mr. Gromyko's proposal is not a concrete plan at all. But the fact remains that our Soviet colleagues do seem to be making that demand, because when they ask us to accept in principle the so-called "nuclear umbrella" concept they appear in effect to be asking us to accept Mr. Gromyko's proposal. As our United States colleague put it last Tuesday, Mr. Tsarapkin seems to be trying to persuade the Committee to decide a substantive issue on procedural grounds (ENDC/PV.200, pp. 15, 16, 20). I think it is unfortunate that the Soviet delegation keeps trying to impose its plan on the Committee. As I said last Tuesday (ibid., p.8), I do not believe that such a one-sided approach commends itself to most representatives round this table.

The issue at stake seems to us basically a simple one: should the working group be restricted in advance to considering only one proposal; or should it be able to evaluate and compare all proposals which fall within the areas on which there is common ground between us all? I have outlined these areas in previous statements in order to show that in our view they are quite sufficient to make agreement possible on the terms of reference of a working group. I shall not outline them again today, although I think that our Soviet colleague was unduly pessimistic when he said last Tuesday:

"These difficulties spring from the fact that we have no common mutually-acceptable approach to the solution of this problem."

(ibid., p.21).

With respect, I must say that I do not think that Mr. Tsarapkin has really placed this whole matter in its proper perspective.

To my mind, there is already an impressive number of areas of common ground between the positions of both sides. I think I should be justified in claiming, after her intervention this morning, that our Swedish colleague holds the same view. In our view we now have a perfectly adequate basis for a working group. Therefore I urge

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our Soviet colleagues to reconsider their position, for it really would be most unfortunate -- I use a mild term -- if they were to spoil their offer of a working group by continuing to insist that these areas of common ground are still not enough. I should regard that as an unreasonable and indeed unnecessary position to adopt.

After all, what are the differences that still exist between the two sides? I think they can be summarized in two ways. First, whereas we are all agreed that nuclear delivery vehicles should be reduced from 100 per cent at the beginning of stage I to zero at the end of stage III, we are not yet agreed about the extent to which such vehicles should be reduced in each disarmament stage. Secondly -- and this is really saying the same thing in another way -- we are not yet agreed on the size and shape of the "nuclear umbrellas" to be retained by both sides during each stage of the disarmament process.

Now, I do not think it is really surprising that in such a complex matter as this there should still be differences of view. But are we, in fact, so far apart that a working group would not help us to resolve these differences in due course? I do not think so. For example, our Soviet colleague told us last Tuesday that in his view --

"... all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except those which would form part of the 'nuclear umbrella', must be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament; ..." (ibid., p.29).

Had our Soviet colleague left it at that, I do not think it would have been too difficult to bridge this particular gap between the positions of the two sides -- and here again I think I have our Swedish colleague with me in maintaining that point of view. The Committee will recall that, as our United States colleague indicated at our meeting of 21 July (ibid., pp. 19, 20), and as indeed I had indicated previously myself (ENDC/PV.198, pp. 22, 23), we too wish to eliminate all nuclear delivery vehicles at the earliest practicable time consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), with the exception of the retention of agreed levels of such vehicles throughout the disarmament process.

Well, there we are; but unfortunately our Soviet colleague is apparently not content with this. He keeps trying to push on beyond the areas of common ground between us. By insisting that acceptance of Mr. Gromyko's proposal must be a prerequisite for the establishment of a working group, he is attempting, as I have already said, to impose that proposal on the Committee. I must confess that I find

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it difficult to follow Mr. Tsarapkin's tactics. He knows very well the real difficulties that we in the West at present see in the proposals so far put forward from the Soviet side for the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. We have often explained these difficulties to the Committee, and there can be no doubt on that score. But at the same time we are fully aware of the difficulties which our Soviet colleague at present sees in the proposals which we have put forward to the same end. He has left us in no doubt about his difficulties, because he has explained them at some length on a number of occasions.

Is it really appropriate, therefore, to continue arguing in plenary meetings about the differences which still divide us and which are well known to us all? Surely it would be much more profitable to accept the fact that there is, as I have claimed, enough common ground between us now to set up a working group which could then examine more fully our existing differences with a view to resolving them. In my submission it is clear that, until a working group has examined all the relevant factors, the Committee cannot be expected to reach agreement on the basic issue which still divides us -- that is, how to achieve the aim on which, as I have said repeatedly, we are all agreed.

As long as one side continues to insist that its views on how to achieve our common objective must be accepted by the Committee before a working group can be set up, I for one fear that the chances of our eventually reaching agreement on this fundamental problem are unlikely to be enhanced. Western representatives have made it clear that we are not insisting that, as a precondition for the establishment of a working group, our Soviet colleagues should agree in principle to our proposals. It seems only fair and equitable, therefore, that we should not be expected to agree in principle to theirs. Perhaps I may quote what I said at our meeting last Tuesday. I said:

"The fact that at present neither side seems able to accept each other's plan is surely no reason against the establishment of a working group which we all want." (ENDC/PV.200, p. 9)

I went on to say:

"On the contrary, I should have thought that this was precisely one of the main reasons why such a group should be set up ...". (ibid., p.10).

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Therefore I would sum up as follows: if we could only agree not to make a working group conditional on the acceptance of each other's proposals, then I believe that the establishment of such a group would not only be possible but would also help us to resolve our existing differences. I regard the establishment of such a group as a matter of very high priority, because I share fully what the Swedish representative said in her statement about the importance of having some proper study of these matters made before we have to make our report to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly not very long from now. Therefore I urge the Soviet representative to agree to let us move forward; and I suggest that the basis on which we should move forward might well be that proposed by the United States representative at our meeting last Tuesday (ibid., pp. 19, 20).

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened with particular attention to the very carefully worked-out and thought-provoking address which we have heard from the representative of Sweden. It is noted with much satisfaction that we have heard some ideas which are, I think, new to this discussion, which has been going on here for many weeks, on how to establish terms of reference for a working group on the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. They will require careful examination and thought, and it would be premature to express any final opinion on them at the present time.

I think that the main suggestion which is novel is that the working group should focus first on what would be the nuclear deterrent force. I prefer that expression to either "nuclear umbrella" or "nuclear shield" because, for reasons which I have previously given, this is not a defensive weapon but a threatening weapon. At any rate I take it that the first task would be to establish what this would be at the beginning of the third stage, for at the end of the third stage all nuclear weapon vehicles and nuclear weapons would be abolished. The second task --- and I take it from what Mrs. Myrdal said that this would be a more difficult one --- would be to study how to reach that new mix at a low level, taking into account timing, phasing and methods of eliminating the residual means of delivery. That is a useful suggestion, and no doubt our co-Chairmen will be considering it as they have considered the previous suggestions on how the working group might be set up and how it might actually work.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

However, I must say that, after listening to both Mrs. Myrdal and Sir Paul Mason this morning, the Canadian delegation regrets that it cannot take quite such a hopeful view of the possibility of setting up a working group as they take. We have heard nothing this morning from the co-Chairmen to indicate that they have agreed on the terms of reference, and therefore we presume that they have not agreed and that the position between them is as it was at our last meeting.

The Canadian delegation is disappointed that the hopes which were raised by Mr. Zorin's offer on 9 June last --- and that is seven weeks ago --- to participate in a working group (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) have not led to an acceleration of the negotiations in the Committee. As we have said many times, my delegation thinks that detailed discussion of our Soviet colleagues' proposals for the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles, combined with what they call the "nuclear umbrella", will be necessary if we are to know what they really mean and whether they would be feasible. It seems that the contradiction between what the Soviet Union thinks ought to be done --- that is, the elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage of disarmament except for a very limited number to constitute the "nuclear umbrella" --- and the United States position, to which the Western countries represented here adhere, that nuclear weapon vehicles should be reduced in roughly equal proportions through three stages of disarmament, is such that it will not be possible to find terms of reference for a working group in which both these ideas can be discussed.

In his final words this morning, if I recall them correctly, Sir Paul Mason said that such a working group could be set up if --- and this is a big "if" --- the two sides could agree that prior acceptance of either side's proposals would not be necessary. However, we find with regret that that is not --- or, at any rate, has not so far been --- the position.

The position being what it is, and in view of what we have heard at previous meetings, perhaps the Soviet delegation is right in its view that it would not be useful to have a working group while the Soviet Union insists on maintaining the principle that it has enunciated and is insisting on, that nearly all nuclear weapon vehicles must be eliminated in stage I and that no more gradually staged elimination is worth discussing.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Whether any of the suggestions that have been made this morning by Mrs. Myrdal might enable us to escape from this dilemma, I do not know. The previous suggestions made by the representatives of India (ENDC/PV.194, p.10), the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.198, p.17) and Nigeria (ENDC/136) have no doubt been considered by the co-Chairmen; and, as these have not yet given us any statement that they are prepared to adopt any of them as terms of reference, we presume that they have not been adequate for resolving the dilemma that exists.

My delegation feels that the efforts of the past two or three weeks show that agreement on the terms of reference will not come about by direct attack on the problem. Therefore we ask other delegations to consider whether we should not deal with some other items at our Tuesday meetings which are devoted to general and complete disarmament. Frankly, we think it would be rather wasting our time to go on hearing each Tuesday another report, either explicit or indicated by silence, that the co-Chairmen cannot agree on terms of reference, and statements by both sides advancing arguments which we have heard many times before and which we all know very well.

That is not to say that the Canadian delegation does not still believe that the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles is the crucial problem of disarmament. We still believe that; but what we say is: let us attack the problem in some other way. The Canadian delegation suggests that the co-Chairmen should, after consultation, propose to the Committee that we should move on to another item on the agenda relating to general and complete disarmament --- one of the items set out in document ENDC/52. Incidentally, we note that the Swedish representative suggested today that the Conference in plenary meeting could move on to some of those other items while the question of the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles was being dealt with by the working group which it was hoped to set up.

Of course, that would not mean that the co-Chairmen, in their private meetings, should not go on for as long as they think it useful to try to agree on terms of reference for a working group on the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles; nor would it mean that, if any other delegation had an inspiration on how to solve this problem, that delegation should not bring it forward. It is always open to any delegation to do that at any meeting.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

However, the Canadian delegation thinks that this problem of reducing nuclear weapon vehicles can best be attacked in the present circumstances by concentrating on some of the collateral measures which we have before us. The first of these is bomber destruction; and we had useful statements of position by the two principal nuclear Powers at our 199th meeting, on 16 July.

Then there is the United States proposal for a freeze of the production of the most important classes of nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/120). Such a freeze would stop the arms race and would give us a firm base for dealing with the problem of how first to reduce and finally to eliminate nuclear weapon vehicles. That suggestion and the proposal for bomber destruction (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.) are in the opinion of the Canadian delegation complementary; and we shall have more to say about them later.

Then, again, it is impossible to consider the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in isolation. Mrs. Myrdal also made that point this morning. We have heard many times that it must be carried out in accordance with the principle of balance, in accordance with the principle that no measure of disarmament should give any State or group of States a military advantage. What are the other items on the agenda relating to general and complete disarmament which affect this problem? They are, of course, the reduction of conventional armaments and the level of armed forces. How we deal with conventional armaments and the strength of armed forces can affect our views on how we should reduce and the extent to which we should reduce nuclear weapon vehicles, which are now relied upon as the principal deterrent against war. Therefore, in turning to the consideration of those other items, we should not be abandoning the attack on the problem of reducing nuclear weapon vehicles but pursuing it from another angle.

Perhaps force levels, a complicated subject involving definitions of the constitution of the forces -- which civilian employees should be included, problems of reservists, and systems of raising and training military forces -- should be considered by a working group of the kind suggested for the nuclear weapon vehicle problem.

All these suggestions are offered with some diffidence. The Canadian delegation does not wish to suggest anything which will be disappointing or discouraging to our colleagues; but we do wish to make the point that for many weeks we have not been

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

making progress. If one road to agreement on the most important aspect of disarmament -- the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles -- should be blocked or lead us into a swamp, why should we not try another? We may reach the goal we want by following another route, or, to use a military metaphor, by trying another line of attack.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): My delegation has followed with the greatest attention the lengthy discussions in this Committee on the question of the working group. It has also delivered several speeches on the subject and has endeavoured to make as constructive a contribution as possible. The Italian delegation has gone thoroughly into the question of the working group's terms of reference, stressing both the vastness of the group's task and the need for precision in defining it. The other Western delegations have likewise played a very active part in seeking an understanding and a compromise on the group's terms of reference.

It would, of course, take too long to summarize the various speeches; but I should like to emphasize that at our last meeting but one the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, submitted a concrete formula for an agreement:

"Our concept for the working group solves this procedural question without compromising the position of either side. It would include the proposals relevant to agenda item 5(b) (ENDC/52), and it would accord with our agreed disarmament principles. We believe that a working group established on the basis of our concept could concentrate on the special problems involved in the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles". (ENDC/PV.200, p.20)

Today the United Kingdom and Canadian representatives spoke again about the working group. All delegations will have listened to their speeches with great attention. In particular Mr. Burns, while declaring his interest in the creation of a working group on the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, said that it would be desirable to pass on to the other items on our agenda. As I shall explain in a moment, I agree with him.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Moreover, the delegations of several non-aligned countries have also taken part in the discussions, in the hope of facilitating a solution acceptable to all. Today the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, made a very valuable contribution which demonstrates the especial importance attached by her delegation to the creation of a working group to study the step-by-step elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Her very important, very elaborate, and very thorough speech will be studied with the utmost care by my delegation. Seldom does a speech merit and require such profound study.

However, I must here and now stress two points. First, the Swedish delegation wants to give the working group far-reaching and complete terms of reference. So do we. I am sure that Mrs. Myrdal does not want, any more than we do, to exclude any path which might lead us to an agreement on what she calls a "shield".

Another point on which I am in full agreement with Mrs. Myrdal concerns the close link between the reduction and step-by-step elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and problems such as the organization of peace machinery and an international peace-keeping force. We share the Swedish delegation's views and believe that, whilst eliminating national armaments, we must at the same time make sure by other means that the world remains genuinely at peace.

Hence, we think -- like Mrs. Myrdal, I believe -- that the greater the reduction in the number of delivery vehicles, the more urgent it will be to organize peace, create an international peace-keeping force, and study these questions in this Committee. My delegation had proposed the creation of several working groups, one of which would study questions pertaining to the organization of peace and the peace-keeping force. But I can very easily follow Mrs. Myrdal in her proposal that the Committee should itself undertake this important task as soon as possible.

Today's efforts by Mrs. Myrdal to extricate our negotiations from the deadlock are very commendable and bear witness to her goodwill, intelligence and spirit of conciliation. But can we expect the Soviet delegation to respond to these overtures positively? I have not much hope, for the Soviet delegation has so far responded with intransigence to all the efforts of the Western and non-aligned delegations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

If we look back at our last few meetings, there can be no doubt that the Soviet delegation's attitude is not at all encouraging. It first pretended to accept the Western proposal for the creation of a working group to make a thorough technical study of the various problems in order to facilitate their solution. It attached to this apparently favourable position manifestly unacceptable conditions, quite contrary to the spirit of normal negotiations, in which the views and thoughts of all negotiators and delegations must be taken into consideration without any exclusion or discrimination.

In substance, the gesture which the Soviet delegation claims to have made may be summed up as follows: "During a lengthy general debate, you found the Gromyko proposal unacceptable, all the while stating your willingness to make a thorough study of it later on. Very well, then (continues the Soviet delegation, whose thought I am trying to interpret) we will give you further explanations of our proposal, provided that you accept it in principle here and now. At the same time we are absolutely opposed to a more thorough and detailed study of your own proposals". Such in substance is the reply given to us by the Soviet delegation in its long and numerous speeches.

Faced with that rigid attitude, the Western position has remained open and comprehensive. To find a solution to the problem of delivery vehicles, we are prepared to examine, and compare on a technical basis, all proposals -- from whichever side they may come -- which are at present before us or which may be submitted later on.

Hence the state of our discussions is now clear enough. I will summarize it as follows.

First, we all agree that the problem of step-by-step elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles merits special study within the framework of general and complete disarmament and in the light of the Agreed Principles.

Second, we agree -- at least in theory -- that the problem of step-by-step elimination of vehicles should be studied on the technical level in a working group.

Third, the Western delegations consider that the Soviet proposals should be examined by the working group.

Fourth, the Western delegations naturally want their own proposals, too, to be considered by the working group, as well as any others that may be forthcoming.

Fifth, the Eastern delegations insist that the working group should have narrow and limited terms of reference and examine only the Soviet proposals, to the explicit and categorical exclusion of all others.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

All the dialectical skill of the Eastern delegations cannot disguise this discouraging state of affairs. We shall know who is to blame if the working group, which could extricate the delivery-vehicle problem from the present deadlock, is not created at this stage of our discussions. To be sure, we do not abandon hope of establishing a working group, or, if need be, other study groups for other subjects; for we consider that this system would help us greatly in the accomplishment of our task. However, my delegation is beginning to think that, in view of the Soviet delegation's present attitude, it does not for the time being appear possible to create this group. A period of reflection may enable the Soviet delegation to assess its responsibilities and modify its position, so that we can return to this problem later on, with perhaps better chances of success.

In the meantime, while regarding the problem of step-by-step reduction and elimination of delivery vehicles as of primary importance, I should like to revert to what Mr. Burns said this morning to the effect that we have before us several proposals for collateral measures which are capable of rapidly improving the situation in the nuclear sector, that these proposals should be thoroughly studied, and that we should devote as much time as possible to this study.

Nor should we forget that there are other problems to be examined before the end of this session. We must before very long prepare our report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The whole Committee -- and each one of us -- has certain responsibilities in that connexion. We cannot say in that report that we spent all our time studying one procedural question, however important, and that we failed because of the Soviet attitude. When we agreed on our agenda for general and complete disarmament, it was understood that, if a given problem presented temporarily insurmountable difficulties, we should pass on to the examination of another question the solution of which would then enable us to remove the difficulties which had previously been found insoluble, particularly as regards nuclear delivery vehicles.

Before concluding, I should like to remind you of the announcement made by the two co-Chairmen on 16 June:

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

"The co-Chairmen recommend to the Committee that, in considering questions relating to general and complete disarmament, it devote the next several of its meetings to a discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed agenda (ENDC/52), taking into account all relevant proposals, including those contained in documents ENDC/2/Rev.1, ENDC/30, and ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1. At a later date the co-Chairmen will develop recommendations concerning the further work of the Committee on questions relating to general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.190, p.50)

That announcement was made to us on 16 June. It is now 28 July; in conformity with the above announcement the Committee should, as I see it, give serious thought to proceeding to a study of the other items on our agenda.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to make a few brief comments in connexion with the statements which have been made today. The Soviet delegation would like to note the statement of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who endeavoured to make a contribution to the discussion of the question of eliminating nuclear weapons by putting forward some new ideas and trying to find a new approach to the solution of this problem. The Soviet delegation will, of course, study most carefully what has been said by Mrs. Myrdal, and we hope to give our views and comments after making that study.

Everyone agrees that the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is the central problem of general and complete disarmament, since this question has a direct bearing on the problem of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war at the earliest stage of disarmament. The discussion of this question in the Committee has revealed the difficulties which have cropped up in the path of the negotiations. However, the existence of these difficulties, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, cannot be a justification or pretext for postponing examination of the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and passing on to the consideration of other questions.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That seems to have been the idea put forward today by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns. So far as I gathered, he was supported in this by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti. The statement of the representative of Canada seemed to us to indicate a peculiar sort of reaction by the Western Powers to the ideas and considerations that have been expounded today by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal. Nevertheless, we think that those ideas and considerations need more careful study and cannot be dismissed out of hand. The Soviet delegation feels that all the possibilities have not yet been exhausted, nor have all the ways been explored. This is shown very clearly both by the statement made today by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and by the previous statements made by the representatives of India, the United Arab Republic and Nigeria concerning the basis for the activities of the working group.

In these circumstances the Soviet delegation is not convinced of the timeliness of the suggestion by the delegation of Canada that the Committee cease discussing the question of a "nuclear umbrella" and pass to other matters.

Mr. CORREA do LAGO (Brazil) (translation from French): Before the end of the present meeting, I wish to perform a task entrusted to me by the delegations of those countries which, together with Brazil, make up the group of eight new members of this Committee.

We request our co-Chairmen to be so good as to study jointly the possibility of including in our work programme the examination of those important questions which have been the subject of General Assembly resolutions and which concern the activities of the Committee of Eighteen. Several of these questions have not yet been duly examined at this session of the Conference, and the eight delegations believe that any discussion of these questions could not fail to advance the negotiations on general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures.

To facilitate the co-Chairmen's task, I would request the Secretariat, on behalf of the delegations of the eight countries, to draw up a complete and official list of all the above resolutions and to be so good as to transmit it to the co-Chairmen and to the other members of the Committee.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): I have listened with very close attention to the several thoughtful statements which have been made this morning. The suggestions of the representative of Sweden certainly deserve careful attention, and we shall give them such attention.

As regards the statement made by the representative of Brazil, I think that he has very properly reminded the Committee of the various matters in the field of disarmament which have been referred to it from time to time by the United Nations General Assembly for action by the Committee.

I think that we may take some satisfaction in the fact that our deliberations are carrying out both the letter and the spirit of several of those resolutions. We can also derive no little satisfaction from the progress which has already been made in achieving agreements that have contributed to the lessening of international tension and a reduction of the risk of war. I believe, also, that we can hope for some degree of understanding by the Members of the United Nations that our appointed tasks are not yet completed, that in fact they are hardly begun.

As we have probed the various aspects of arms control and disarmament, we have discovered more and more the complexity and the difficulty of the questions with which we are dealing. But this in itself is progress. Our improved understanding of what we face should help us in finding practical and effective answers; and neither we nor the United Nations should be a prey to despair simply because we have not yet found many of those answers.

Nevertheless, I entirely agree that we in this Conference should be mindful of our own responsibilities and should be sure that we are doing all we can to discharge them. I would be prepared, therefore, subject to the concurrence of the Soviet co-Chairman, to consider at an early co-Chairmen's meeting the matters to which the representative of Brazil has referred. The co-Chairmen might then report to this Committee the results of their deliberations, and the Committee could then consider the question at a later time.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): As regards the proposal of the representative of Brazil, if there is no objection from the Committee, I shall ask the Secretariat to prepare the list suggested.^{1/}

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 202nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Abdel Fattah Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, the Soviet Union, Brazil and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 30 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/139.